Hyperledger-Fabric源码分析（MSP-Setup）
上篇我们知道证书是怎么生成了，接下来看下MSP启动是怎么加载这些材料的。
文章图片
20180413180640626.JPG setupCrypto
func (msp *bccspmsp) setupCrypto(conf *m.FabricMSPConfig) error {
msp.cryptoConfig = conf.CryptoConfig
if msp.cryptoConfig == nil {
// Move to defaults
msp.cryptoConfig = &m.FabricCryptoConfig{
SignatureHashFamily:bccsp.SHA2,
IdentityIdentifierHashFunction: bccsp.SHA256,
}
mspLogger.Debugf("CryptoConfig was nil. Move to defaults.")
}
if msp.cryptoConfig.SignatureHashFamily == "" {
msp.cryptoConfig.SignatureHashFamily = bccsp.SHA2
mspLogger.Debugf("CryptoConfig.SignatureHashFamily was nil. Move to defaults.")
}
if msp.cryptoConfig.IdentityIdentifierHashFunction == "" {
msp.cryptoConfig.IdentityIdentifierHashFunction = bccsp.SHA256
mspLogger.Debugf("CryptoConfig.IdentityIdentifierHashFunction was nil. Move to defaults.")
}return nil
}
【Hyperledger-Fabric源码分析（MSP-Setup）】一个是签名摘要的hash算法，一个是身份摘要的hash算法。setupCAs
func (msp *bccspmsp) setupCAs(conf *m.FabricMSPConfig) error {
// make and fill the set of CA certs - we expect them to be there
if len(conf.RootCerts) == 0 {
return errors.New("expected at least one CA certificate")
}// pre-create the verify options with roots and intermediates.
// This is needed to make certificate sanitation working.
// Recall that sanitization is applied also to root CA and intermediate
// CA certificates. After their sanitization is done, the opts
// will be recreated using the sanitized certs.
msp.opts = &x509.VerifyOptions{Roots: x509.NewCertPool(), Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool()}
for _, v := range conf.RootCerts {
cert, err := msp.getCertFromPem(v)
if err != nil {
return err
}
msp.opts.Roots.AddCert(cert)
}
for _, v := range conf.IntermediateCerts {
cert, err := msp.getCertFromPem(v)
if err != nil {
return err
}
msp.opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}// Load root and intermediate CA identities
// Recall that when an identity is created, its certificate gets sanitized
msp.rootCerts = make([]Identity, len(conf.RootCerts))
for i, trustedCert := range conf.RootCerts {
id, _, err := msp.getIdentityFromConf(trustedCert)
if err != nil {
return err
}msp.rootCerts[i] = id
}// make and fill the set of intermediate certs (if present)
msp.intermediateCerts = make([]Identity, len(conf.IntermediateCerts))
for i, trustedCert := range conf.IntermediateCerts {
id, _, err := msp.getIdentityFromConf(trustedCert)
if err != nil {
return err
}msp.intermediateCerts[i] = id
}// root CA and intermediate CA certificates are sanitized, they can be reimported
msp.opts = &x509.VerifyOptions{Roots: x509.NewCertPool(), Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool()}
for _, id := range msp.rootCerts {
msp.opts.Roots.AddCert(id.(*identity).cert)
}
for _, id := range msp.intermediateCerts {
msp.opts.Intermediates.AddCert(id.(*identity).cert)
}return nil
}
这里主要做两件事情setupAdmins
- 拿到ca和中间ca目录的证书去组装msp的opts，可以看到这个opts由两个certpool组成。其作用之一就是底层x509在做证书校验的时候，会看是否是这两个pool里的ca签发的。
- 接下来是将证书包装成身份加入到msp的rootCerts和intermediateCerts中，这个身份是fabric基于证书的再包装，由mspid，证书，证书摘要，证书公钥，msp组成。前面的是给底层用的，而这里是供MSP服务用的。
func (msp *bccspmsp) setupAdmins(conf *m.FabricMSPConfig) error {
// make and fill the set of admin certs (if present)
msp.admins = make([]Identity, len(conf.Admins))
for i, admCert := range conf.Admins {
id, _, err := msp.getIdentityFromConf(admCert)
if err != nil {
return err
}msp.admins[i] = id
}return nil
}
setupCRLs
- 跟前面类似，生成admin的身份信息加到msp的admins里面
func (msp *bccspmsp) setupCRLs(conf *m.FabricMSPConfig) error {
// setup the CRL (if present)
msp.CRL = make([]*pkix.CertificateList, len(conf.RevocationList))
for i, crlbytes := range conf.RevocationList {
crl, err := x509.ParseCRL(crlbytes)
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(err, "could not parse RevocationList")
}// TODO: pre-verify the signature on the CRL and create a map
//of CA certs to respective CRLs so that later upon
//validation we can already look up the CRL given the
//chain of the certificate to be validatedmsp.CRL[i] = crl
}return nil
}
finalizeSetupCAs
- 这里会去crls目录加载撤销证书列表，换句话说这里是被吊销执照的证书的集合。至于是证书主动过期还是被动吊销，不重要，在证书校验的环节，会来这里检查证书的有效与否。
func (msp *bccspmsp) finalizeSetupCAs() error {
// ensure that our CAs are properly formed and that they are valid
for _, id := range append(append([]Identity{}, msp.rootCerts...), msp.intermediateCerts...) {
if !id.(*identity).cert.IsCA {
return errors.Errorf("CA Certificate did not have the CA attribute, (SN: %x)", id.(*identity).cert.SerialNumber)
}
if _, err := getSubjectKeyIdentifierFromCert(id.(*identity).cert);
err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, fmt.Sprintf("CA Certificate problem with Subject Key Identifier extension, (SN: %x)", id.(*identity).cert.SerialNumber))
}if err := msp.validateCAIdentity(id.(*identity));
err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, fmt.Sprintf("CA Certificate is not valid, (SN: %s)", id.(*identity).cert.SerialNumber))
}
}// populate certificationTreeInternalNodesMap to mark the internal nodes of the
// certification tree
msp.certificationTreeInternalNodesMap = make(map[string]bool)
for _, id := range append([]Identity{}, msp.intermediateCerts...) {
chain, err := msp.getUniqueValidationChain(id.(*identity).cert, msp.getValidityOptsForCert(id.(*identity).cert))
if err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, fmt.Sprintf("failed getting validation chain, (SN: %s)", id.(*identity).cert.SerialNumber))
}// Recall chain[0] is id.(*identity).id so it does not count as a parent
for i := 1;
i < len(chain);
i++ {
msp.certificationTreeInternalNodesMap[string(chain[i].Raw)] = true
}
}return nil
}
这里主要做两件事情。setupSigningIdentity
- 校验前面加载的ca和中间ca的身份信息。
- 证书是否有效，是否是ca啦，是否设置了SKI啊，等等。
- 接着就是校验身份了，这里不赘述了，可以去看身份校验篇。
- 接下来组装证书树，也就是certificationTreeInternalNodesMap，简单来说就是中间ca证书为叶子向上回溯到根证书的全部链路，组成一棵树状结构。
func (msp *bccspmsp) setupSigningIdentity(conf *m.FabricMSPConfig) error {
if conf.SigningIdentity != nil {
sid, err := msp.getSigningIdentityFromConf(conf.SigningIdentity)
if err != nil {
return err
}expirationTime := sid.ExpiresAt()
now := time.Now()
if expirationTime.After(now) {
mspLogger.Debug("Signing identity expires at", expirationTime)
} else if expirationTime.IsZero() {
mspLogger.Debug("Signing identity has no known expiration time")
} else {
return errors.Errorf("signing identity expired %v ago", now.Sub(expirationTime))
}msp.signer = sid
}return nil
}
setupTLSCAs
- 去signcerts目录加载ca签发的证书，这里第一时间会判断是否证书已经过期
- 设置msp的signer，顾名思义，这个证书是用来给别人验签用的。
func (msp *bccspmsp) setupTLSCAs(conf *m.FabricMSPConfig) error {opts := &x509.VerifyOptions{Roots: x509.NewCertPool(), Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool()}// Load TLS root and intermediate CA identities
msp.tlsRootCerts = make([][]byte, len(conf.TlsRootCerts))
rootCerts := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(conf.TlsRootCerts))
for i, trustedCert := range conf.TlsRootCerts {
cert, err := msp.getCertFromPem(trustedCert)
if err != nil {
return err
}rootCerts[i] = cert
msp.tlsRootCerts[i] = trustedCert
opts.Roots.AddCert(cert)
}// make and fill the set of intermediate certs (if present)
msp.tlsIntermediateCerts = make([][]byte, len(conf.TlsIntermediateCerts))
intermediateCerts := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(conf.TlsIntermediateCerts))
for i, trustedCert := range conf.TlsIntermediateCerts {
cert, err := msp.getCertFromPem(trustedCert)
if err != nil {
return err
}intermediateCerts[i] = cert
msp.tlsIntermediateCerts[i] = trustedCert
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}// ensure that our CAs are properly formed and that they are valid
for _, cert := range append(append([]*x509.Certificate{}, rootCerts...), intermediateCerts...) {
if cert == nil {
continue
}if !cert.IsCA {
return errors.Errorf("CA Certificate did not have the CA attribute, (SN: %x)", cert.SerialNumber)
}
if _, err := getSubjectKeyIdentifierFromCert(cert);
err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, fmt.Sprintf("CA Certificate problem with Subject Key Identifier extension, (SN: %x)", cert.SerialNumber))
}if err := msp.validateTLSCAIdentity(cert, opts);
err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, fmt.Sprintf("CA Certificate is not valid, (SN: %s)", cert.SerialNumber))
}
}return nil
}
这里的处理方式跟ca的部分很相似。setupOUs
- 为了跟ca相互区别，会将证书转换成身份信息存入msp的tlsRootCerts和tlsIntermediateCerts
- 验证这些tls的ca身份信息
- 证书是否有效，是否是ca啦，是否设置了SKI啊，等等。
- 接着就是校验身份了，这里不赘述了，可以去看身份校验篇。这里需要注意的是前面ca的opts是保存下来以备将来之需的，而这里只是临时用一下。tlsca的证书只是tls通讯协议要用到，而msp是完全基于ca的，不一样的。
func (msp *bccspmsp) setupOUs(conf *m.FabricMSPConfig) error {
msp.ouIdentifiers = make(map[string][][]byte)
for _, ou := range conf.OrganizationalUnitIdentifiers {certifiersIdentifier, err := msp.getCertifiersIdentifier(ou.Certificate)
if err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, fmt.Sprintf("failed getting certificate for [%v]", ou))
}// Check for duplicates
found := false
for _, id := range msp.ouIdentifiers[ou.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier] {
if bytes.Equal(id, certifiersIdentifier) {
mspLogger.Warningf("Duplicate found in ou identifiers [%s, %v]", ou.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier, id)
found = true
break
}
}if !found {
// No duplicates found, add it
msp.ouIdentifiers[ou.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier] = append(
msp.ouIdentifiers[ou.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier],
certifiersIdentifier,
)
}
}return nil
}
这里涉及到Organizational Units的概念，可以理解成公司下属的部门。是Organization的再细分。setupNodeOUs
OrganizationalUnitIdentifiers: - Certificate: "cacerts/cacert.pem" OrganizationalUnitIdentifier: "COP"
- 而这里是在收集config.yaml中配置的OrganizationalUnitIdentifiers，内部是通过设置的证书拿到证书链，然后取摘要，保存到为“COP”为key的ouIdentifiers中。
- 有兴趣的可以去查下这里是用来干什么的，再仔细体会下。
- 之前的证书只是校验是不是属于这个公司，只需要看他的签发单位是根ca或中间ca就够了。而部门的验证不能这样粗糙，起码要证明是指定的证书来签发的。
- 其次所有属于这个部门的成员，必须要由配置文件指定的证书来签发。
- 而这里的实现是通过取待认证节点的签发单位的证书链摘要，来去msp里的“COP”的ouIdentifiers里查询，看是否已经包含了，如果能找到，说明这个节点确定是这个部门的成员。
- 想象下，如果从cacert.pem再往下签发一个中间ca证书，来签发部门成员行不行？显然不行，按照上面的实现，是不属于该部门，除非你在配置文件里面明确设置。
func (msp *bccspmsp) setupNodeOUs(config *m.FabricMSPConfig) error {
if config.FabricNodeOus != nil {msp.ouEnforcement = config.FabricNodeOus.Enable// ClientOU
msp.clientOU = &OUIdentifier{OrganizationalUnitIdentifier: config.FabricNodeOus.ClientOuIdentifier.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier}
if len(config.FabricNodeOus.ClientOuIdentifier.Certificate) != 0 {
certifiersIdentifier, err := msp.getCertifiersIdentifier(config.FabricNodeOus.ClientOuIdentifier.Certificate)
if err != nil {
return err
}
msp.clientOU.CertifiersIdentifier = certifiersIdentifier
}// PeerOU
msp.peerOU = &OUIdentifier{OrganizationalUnitIdentifier: config.FabricNodeOus.PeerOuIdentifier.OrganizationalUnitIdentifier}
if len(config.FabricNodeOus.PeerOuIdentifier.Certificate) != 0 {
certifiersIdentifier, err := msp.getCertifiersIdentifier(config.FabricNodeOus.PeerOuIdentifier.Certificate)
if err != nil {
return err
}
msp.peerOU.CertifiersIdentifier = certifiersIdentifier
}} else {
msp.ouEnforcement = false
}return nil
}
postSetup
- 这里跟上面Organizational Units的处理类似，上面称之为组织分类，而这里是身份分类。这里我们看下配置文件。
- 也就是说成员证书设置为peer或client，且证书链摘要能被msp承认，那么就会被msp识别为你所声明的身份。
NodeOUs: Enable: true ClientOUIdentifier: Certificate: "cacerts/cacert.pem" OrganizationalUnitIdentifier: "client" PeerOUIdentifier: Certificate: "cacerts/cacert.pem" OrganizationalUnitIdentifier: "peer"
func (msp *bccspmsp) postSetupV11(conf *m.FabricMSPConfig) error {
// Check for OU enforcement
if !msp.ouEnforcement {
// No enforcement required. Call post setup as per V1
return msp.postSetupV1(conf)
}// Check that admins are clients
principalBytes, err := proto.Marshal(&m.MSPRole{Role: m.MSPRole_CLIENT, MspIdentifier: msp.name})
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrapf(err, "failed creating MSPRole_CLIENT")
}
principal := &m.MSPPrincipal{
PrincipalClassification: m.MSPPrincipal_ROLE,
Principal:principalBytes}
for i, admin := range msp.admins {
err = admin.SatisfiesPrincipal(principal)
if err != nil {
return errors.WithMessage(err, fmt.Sprintf("admin %d is invalid", i))
}
}return nil
}
如果设置了config.yaml的NodeOUs为false，那么只需要验证admin的证书是否是ca签发的即可小结
如果是false，那需要判断，admin的签发单位身份是否是client，至于为什么这么设计，难道peer就不能成为admin？我还没领会到精髓。不过我找到官方文档的一段话。
When the classification is enabled, MSP administrators need to be clients of that MSP, meaning that their x509 certificates need to carry the OU that identifies the clients.
- 至此，整个MSP安装结束，可以看到其实还是很讲究的，知道了这些，之后校验的实现会看得很快了。
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